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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
PAUL ERNEST JOPES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE
COUNTY RECREATION BOARD,
JUNIOR CHAMBER OF C 0 MMERCE OF SALT LAKE CITY,
MEADOW BROOK GOLF CLUB and
JOSEPH MICHAEL RILEY,

Case No. 8702

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS SALT LAKE COUNTY
AND JOSEPH MICHAEL RILEY

STATEMENT OF FACTS
We cannot agree in full with the statement of facts
set forth in appellant's brief, and we submit the following by way of modification and supplementation:
Appellant apparently attempts to leave the impression that Meadow Brook Golf Course is operated by
the County in competition with golf courses operated
by private enterprise for pecuniary profit. He states
on page 2 and again on page 12, of his brief that the
cour.se is operated precisely the same as any private
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course In the city. We find no evidence in the record
to support this statement. In fact there is no evidence in
the record as to manner of operation of any other golf
course in Salt Lake County.
We believe that it is a matter of such common
knowledge that this court can take judicial notice, that
the only golf courses in Salt Lake County .are those operated by the County itself; or by Salt Lake City, a municipal corporation; or private courses where play and
use of the facilities is limited to the members of the
private club and their guests. There are no golf courses
in Salt Lake County, and so far .as we know, there are
few if any golf courses in the entire country operated
by private enterprise for pecuniary profit, except as
such courses may be incidental to a large resort or
amusement area such for example as Sun Yalley, Idaho
or the Broadmoor Hotel in Colorado Springs.
It is apparently suggested in appellant's brief that
golf lessons are given by the County. This also is incoJ.~rect. Golf lessons are given by the defendant Riley
as part of his duties .as the professional at the golf
course. However, the fees paid for such lessons belong
to him, and are part of his compensation for serdces
rendered (Ex. 24-P, par. -±(c)).
Appellant, at page -1 of his brief, refers to the lease
agreement between Salt Lake County and Jessie Smith,
the operator of the restaurant .at the club house. This
agreement is evidenced by Ex. 25-P which was offered
in evidence hy appellant but was not received. Since
appellant does not here cmnplain of any error in the
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court's failure to receive it in evidence, it is not before
this court, on this appeal, for any purpose.
Appellant would have the court believe that bec.ause
a portion of the club house premises was leased to Mrs.
Smith for her pecuniary profit, that the operation of
the entire golf course became an operation for pecuniary
profit. It is common knowledge that in practically all
public parks, concessionaires oper.ate rides, games,
amusement devices of various type.s, and refreshment
stands on a concession basis for pecuniary profit, from
the governmental agency owning and operating the park.
This does not make the operation of the park any the
less a governmental function.
Appellant also failed to make note of the fact that
holding of the Utah Open Golf Tournament at the
lVIeadow Brook Golf Club not only did not financially
benefit the County in any way, but actually was a fin.ancial detriment. Because the course was being used by
the tournament players, the County lost the green fees
which otherwise would have been paid by members of
the public for the use of the golf course during the
period of the tournament. The entry fees for the players,
gallery fees paid by spectators, and other income from
the tournament did not go to the County, but, after
payment of the expenses of the tournament, the excess
of the income was divided among the sponsoring organizations (R. 235, 255 to 257, 296).
The right to hold one men's open or .amateur tournament on the golf course each year was guaranteed by
Riley's contract of employment with the County (Ex.
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24-P, R-232, 245). It was £n the nature of a further consideration to Riley for hu services, .since it was in no
wise a benefit to the County (R. 232).
The club house itself was built about 1950 by conversion for use as a club house of a building previously
erected. The concrete abutements .along the passageway
where plaintiff fell, and, in fact, along the entire east
wall of the club house, were part of the original building,
and were left there when the building was converted to
a club house (R. 247). None of the defendants in this
action had anything whatsoever to do with their placemrnt.
It is undisputed that a score board for use in the
Utah Open Tournament, was erected on the outside
portion of the east wall of the club house which was
opposite to the passageway from the pro-shop to the
dining room (R. 260-261). It is also admitted that the
score board occluded a portion of the sunlight which
otherwise would have passed through the glass bricks
into the passageway. However, the evidence is clear and
conclusive that there were other sources of light, which
made the abutements in the passageway visible to users
thereof (R. 248, 271, 29-!, 300-301, 302-303, 306-308, 313314).
The defendant Riley testified that there was ample
light in the hall with the score boards up (R. :2-!S, 271).
Carman l{ipp, an officer of the defendant Salt Lake
Junior Chamber of C01umerce, testified that there was
light enough to see where you were going. He testified
as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

"Q. And, from your observation being in
there, could you tell us what that condition of
light was~
"A. Well, you could see in there; it wasn't
as bright as outside, but it was light enough to
see where you were going. There were various
sources of light letting in, and I didn't have any
trouble seeing in there.

"Q. Did you observe whether or not there
was light coming into the passageway from the
cafe area"!
"A.

Yes, there was.

"Q. Did you observe whether or not there
was light coming into the passageway from the
golf club area~
"A. Yes, there was; those two doors, as I
recall it, were open during the time that this was
all going on during the daytime; all were kept
open." (R. 294)
Edward J. Whitney, another Junior Chamber Officer testified that there was light from both ends of the
passageway and that the abutements were clearly visible
(R. 300-1).
Kenneth J. Done, Executive Secretary of the Junior
Chamber of Commerce, testified that during the running
of the tournament he passed through the passageway
about twenty-five times a day; that there was nothing
unusual about the lighting conditions, and that there was
"plenty of light to see by," and that he saw the abutements (R. 302-3).
Jack Gilbert, an officer of Meadow Brook Golf Club,
testified that he traveled through the pa.ssageway a dozen
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times a day during the tournament; that there was nothing unusual about the lighting conditions; that there was
light in the passageway from both ends, and from the
adjacent card room, and that he had no difficulty in
seeing the abutements when passing through the passageway after dark (R. 306-8).
Sidney Nelsen te.stified that on the night of the
Calcutta Drawing, he traversed the passageway without difficulty (R. 313-314). The night before, plaintiff
himself passed through it without difficulty (R. 169,
171).
Although the plaintiff passed through the passageway five or six times prior to the accident, he never
noticed the abutements (R. 118, 167, 177). At the time
of the accident, he had been inside a sufficient length
of time, according to hi.s own testimony, to permit his
eyes to become accustomed to the difference between
the inside and outside light (R. 184). However, when
he was asked directly why he didn't see the abutement,
he admitted that he didn't know (R. 178). His exact
testimony was as follows:

"Q. And why, if you ean tell us, didn't you
see these large cen1ent abuten1ents T
"A.

That is what I ·would like to know."

(R. 17S)
At no place in his testinwny did he claiin that he tripped
over the abuteinent because he w.as unable to see it.
It was stipulated by counsel for the plaintiff that
if Glen T. James, Auditor of Salt Lake County, were
called ns a witness he would testify in accordance with
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his answers to interrogatorie.s previously filed. These
show that during the years 1954, 1955 and 1956, the
gross income from the oper.ation of the Meadow Brook
Golf Course to the County was respectively, $30,579.75,
$32,522.10, and $36,314.50. During the year 1956, costs
of operation were $50,309.11. For preceding years, detailed records of costs of operation were not available
but were estimated to be approximately the same as for
1956 (R. 80). In short, the operation of the golf course
resulted in an annual deficit to the County of from .about
$14,000 to $18,000. It was not in anywise a profitable
venture to the County.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the
defendant Salt Lake County moved for a directed verdict
on the following grounds:
1. That as a body politic and governmental unit,
Salt Lake County w.as immune from tort liability for
damages for personal injuries (R. 281).
2. Even if Salt Lake County may be liable in tort
for d.amages for personal injuries, the operation of a
golf cour.se is a governmental and not a proprietary
function, .and therefore the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies (R. 282).
3. There was no evidence of any negligence on
the part of the defendant Salt Lake County (R. 282).
4. There is no evidence that the accident was caused
by any negligence on the part of the defendant Salt
Lake County (R. 282).
5.

Plaintiff's own evidence showed that as .a mat-
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ter of law he was guilty of contributory negligence (R.
282).
The defendant J. M. Riley moved for a directed
verdict on the grounds that there was no evidence of
negligence on his part, that there was no evidence that
the accident was caused by any negligence on his part,
and that plaintiff was guilty of negligence .as a matter
of law (R. 282-283).
The court reserved ruling on the motions, but at
the conclusion of all of the evidence, the motions were
renewed, and after extensive argument to the court, the
motions were granted.

STATEMENT OF POIXTS TO BE ARGUED
POINT I.
SALT LAKE COUNTY IS AN ARM OF THE STATE
AND AS SUCH IS VESTED WITH SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY,
AND, IN THE ABSENCE OF PERMISSIVE LEGISLATION,
CANNOT BE SUED IN TORT FOR NEGLIGENCE.
POINT II.
EVEN IF SALT LAKE COUNTY IS LIABLE IN TORT
FOR PROPRIETARY ACTS, THE OPERATION OF A PUBLJ.C
GOLF COURSE IS A GOVERNMENTAL AND NOT A PROPRIETARY FUNCTION, AND THEREFORE THE DOcTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY APPLIES.
POINT III.
EVEN IF THE OPERATION OF A PUBLIC GOLF COURSE
IS DEEMED TO BE A PROPRIETARY FUNCTION, THERE
IS NO EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF
DEFENDANT SALT LAKE COUNTY.
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POINT IV.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE ACCIDENT WAS
·CAUSED BY ANY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF ANY
OF THE DEFENDANTS.
POINT V.
THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW .

.ARGUMENT
We recognize of course, that on this appeal the evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. However, there is a presumption in favor of the regularity
and validity of all proceedings in the court below. The
motions for directed verdict, were based upon multiple
grounds. If these respondents are correct on any one
of their points, the judgment below should be affirmed.
We shall undertake to demonstrate that respondents
were correct in each and all of their points.
POINT I.
SALT LAKE COUNTY IS AN ARM OF THE STATE
AND AS SUCH IS VESTED WITH SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY,
AND, IN THE ABSENCE OF PERMISSIVE LEGISLATION,
CANNOT BE SUED IN TORT FOR NEGLIGENCE.

Without even taking the trouble to examine the
constitutional differences between Counties on the one
hand, and cities and towns on the other, and without
even a passing reference to Utah decisions dealing with
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as applied to Counties, appellant would summarily tear away the distinction which has heretofore existed, .and place counties in
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the same category as cities, and other municipal corporations, as regards the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Although appellant has quoted copiously from the decisions of other jurisdictions in an effort to persuade
this court to put aside its well established rule, he has
ignored the Utah precedents on this very subject. Before
so lightly setting aside a rule so long and well established, we believe it appropriate to examine into its
origin, and the validity of the bases upon which it rests.
A helpful basic discussion appears in 14 Am. Jur., commencing at page 215, Counties, Sees. 48 and 49. \Ve quote
the more illuminating portions:
"Sec. 48. Generally.-It is well settled that
since counties are organized for public purposes
and charged with the performance of duties as
arms or br~nches of the state government, they
are never to be held liable in a private action
for neglect to perform such duties, for acts done
while engaged in the performance of such duties,
or because they are not performed in a manner
Inost conducive to the safety of employees or
the public. unless such liability is expressly fixed
by statute. The fact that counties are declared
by statute to be Inunicipal corporations does not
change the rule in the absence of anything in
the statute imposing any additional liability.
~loreover, no Ile'Y liability for torts is imposed
upon a county by state Inaking it a municipal
corporation for exercising the powers and diseharging the duties of local governn1ent and adIninistering public affairs, and providing that actions for dmnages for any injury to property or
rights for wltieh it is liable shall be in the name
of the county. * * *
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"Sec. 49. Reason for Rule of N onliability.The principal ground upon which it is held that
counties are not liable for damages in actions
for their neglect of public duty is that they are
involuntary political divisions of the state, created for public purposes connected with the administration of local government. They are involuntary corporations, because created by the state,
without the solicitation or even the consent of
the people within their boundaries, and made depositaries of limited political and governmental
functions, to be exercised for the public good, in
behalf of the state, and not for the:mselves. They
are in fact no less ,than public agencies of the state,
invested by it with their particular powers, but
no power to decline the functions devolved upon
them, and hence, are clothed with the same immunity from liability as the state itself. In other
words, the rule of nonliability for tort.s is dictated
by public policy. Since a suit against the County
is in effect, a suit against the state, an action
will not lie without the consent of the legislature."
See .also the discussion in 38 Am. Jur., commencing
at page 260, ~[unicipal Corporations, Sec. 571, et seq.:
"Sec. 571. Generally-It was well settled at
common law that a mere territorial subdivision,
such as a county or a hundred, was not liable
for the negligence of its officers. Such a body,
while it in a certain sense constituted a legal
entity, was not considered a municipal corporation. * * *
"In this country, all territorial subdivisions
created by the state and having the power to
assess and collect taxes are so far quasi corporations as to be liable to be sued, but a mere territorial subdivision such as a county, township,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
or district performing only governmental functions and having no right of self government or
private or proprietary interest is not ordinarily
liable to actions of tort, in the absence of statutory provi~ion. * * *"
"Sec. 573. - Basis and History. - Following
the decision in Russell v. Devon County, it became a settled principle of the common law that
an individual could not maintain an action against
a political subdivision of the state for injury resulting from negligence in the performance of
any governmental function. The municipality was
but a hand of the sovereign, and it was the 'right
divine of kings to govern wrong.' Thi.s principle
today is but a rudimentary survival of the maxim
'The King can do no wrong,' and immunit~~ is still
based on the theory that the sovereign cannot
be sued without its consent, and that a designated
agency of the Sovereign is likewise immune. The
rea.son frequently assigned in the earlier cases was
that the principle which holds that it is better
for the individual to suffer than the public to be
inconvenienced is stronger than the conflicting
principle that for every injury the law gives a
remedy. The later cases more often support the
rule of govermnental inm1unity on the ground of
a public policy which seeks to prevent public
funds and public property from being diverted
from publir uses and applied to the liquidation
of private da1nages. Smne cases likewise reason
that it would be against public policy to retard
and stifle gratuitous governmental activities
vitally n0cessary to the public health and welfare
of thP population of expanding urban centers by
subjecting 1nnnicipal corporations to tort liability
as to parks, playgrozwds, etc." (En1phasis ours.)
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In this state, counties are established by constitutional fiat. Article XI, Sec. I, of the State Constitution
provides as follows :
"The several counties of the Territory of
Utah, existing at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution, are hereby recognized as legal subdivisions of this State, and the precincts, and
school districts, now existing in said counties, as
legal subdivisions thereof, .and they shall so continue until changed by law in pursuance of this
article." (Emphasis ours.)
A relatively early Utah case, Lowry v. Carbon
County, (Ut.), 232 Pac. 909, considered the problem here
involved, and set it at rest until the present time. This
court there said :
"First, does the complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Carbon County~ We are clearly of the opinion that
it does not, .and that as to the defendant Carbon
County, the trial court properly sustained the
general demurrer. The law relating to the liability of counties, under circumstances present in
this case, is so clearly stated in 7 R.C.L. at pages
954 and 957, that no further citation of authority
is either advisable or necessary at this time.
" 'While a municipal corporation is liable to
an individual in certain cases for a failure to
discharge its corporate duties upon the ground
that its powers have been granted at the special
solicitation, and for the benefit of its citizens,
and not so much to aid in the administration of
the state government as for the local advantage~
and convenience, still the law is well settled that
counties being organized for public purposes, and
charged with the performance of duties as an an;t
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or branch of the state government, are never to
be held liable in a private action for neglect to
perform a corporate duty, or for acts done while
engaged in the performance of such duties, or
because they are not performed in a manner most
conducive to the safety of its employees or the
public, unless such liability is expressly fixed by
statute. The rule i.s dictated by public policy, and
the fact that counties are declared by statute to
be municipal corporations does not change it in
the absence of anything in the statute imposing
any additional liability. The principal ground
upon which it is held that counties are not liable
for damages in actions for their neglect of public
duty is that they are involuntary political divisions of the state, created for governmental purpo_ses, and are organized without regard to the
consent or dissent of the inhabitants. The theory
upon which municipal corporations proper are
held liable in such cases is that they are voluntary associations, created and organized at the
solicitation of, and with the free consent of, the
inhabitants, under the laws of the state, and that
the benefits accruing to the people b~· such incorporation compensate them for the liability. Another reason is that, since a county is but a polit·ical subdhisiou of the state, a suit against the
county is, in effect, a suit against the state, and
that therefore an action zrill1wt lie without consent of the Legislature. ~ ~ ~
.. ·It is a general .and well-established rule
that counties are not liable at common law for
injuries resulting frmn the negligence of their
officers or agents. ~\nd when the law itself iinposes a duty' upon the board of county commissioners as such, and they are not appointed thereto hy the rounty, the ronnty will not be responsible for their breach of duty or for their nonSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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feasance or misfe.asance
duty.' " (Emphasis ours.)

1n

relation to such

In the more recent case of Bingham v. Board of
Education of Ogden City, (Ut.), 223 Pac. (2d) 432, which
involved a school district, rather than a county, this
court followed the same reasoning:
"The general law of this jurisdiction, as in
most other jurisdictions, does not authorize actions for damages for personal injuries against
school districts. School districts are corporations
with limited powers, and act merely on behalf of
the state in discharging the duty of the educating
the children of school age in the public schools
created by general laws.

* * *
"Since many of the cases relied on by plaintiffs deal with the liability of municipal corporations, we point out that the authorities seem to
make a distinction between municipal corporations and what are termed 'quasi-municipal' corporations. This distinction is better understood
when consideration is given to the fact that school
boards are created exclusively for school purposes and are mere agencies of the state established for the sole purpose of administering a
.system of public education for which they receive
no private or corpor.ate benefit; and that, as to
tort liability, such agencies or authorities occupy
a status different fron1 that of municipal corporations which ordinarily have a dual character
and which may exercise proprietary as well as governmental functions. McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, explains the distinctions as follows
(Sec. 2775, 2d Ed.) :
" '* * * It is pertinent to state here that thC'rP
is a distinction between municipal corporations
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proper and quasi-municipal corporations concerning liability for torts, and that the general rule
is that the latter is not liable for torts unless
allowed by statute. * * *
.
" 'The immunity from liability of quasi-public
corporations is generally placed upon the ground
of their involuntary and public character. They
are usually treated as public or state agencies,
.and their duties are ordinarily wholly governmental. They exercise the greater part of their
functions as agencies of the state merely, and
are created for purposes of public policy, and
hence the general rule that they are not responsible for the neglect of duties enjoined on them,
unless the action is given by statute. On the other
hand, it is recognized that the municipal corporation proper has functions which are performed
by it not as a mere agent of the state, but in its
capacity as a corporation serving alone the local
inhabitants. If the city should be regarded as a
state agency at all times, which is frequently asserted without qualification by courts, there
would exist no logical ground for holding it liable
for damages due to negligence, since in no instance i.s a state held liable under the general
principles of law.'
"The Supreme Court of Iowa, in the case of
Snethen v. Harrison County, 172 Iowa 81, 152
N.\V. 12, 13, refused to declare a county liable
for negligence in the performance of its governInental functions. There the court based its reasoning on the distinction between the involuntary
and yoluntary nature of political and territorial
divisions of the state. and said: 'Counties, unlike
ritirs and incorporated towns. are not, as a rule,
hPld liable for torts con1n1itted by the1n, so long
as they are acting within the scope of their governmental powers. They are quasi n1unicipal corSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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porations engaged in the performance of governmental functions and are not responsible for the
neglect of duties enjoined upon them, in the absence of a statute giving a right of action.'"
This court also quoted with approval from a Tennessee case, Odil v. Maury County, 175 Tenn. 550, 136
S.W. 2d, 500, also involving a public playground or recreation place, as follows:
" . . . . . 'In the present case the county w.a~
acting within it.s delegated power when it constructed this school building; and even if it be
conceded that the opening into which plaintiff
fell constituted a nuisance, a question unnece~
sary for this court to determine, the defendant
is no more liable than was the county in Tyler
v. Obion County, et al. (171 Tenn. 550, 106 S.W.
2d 548) supra, where the county committed a
nuisance by dumping six or seven large piles
of gravel or rock in the middle of the road and
left them there overnight."
The principle was reaffirmed in the case of Shaw
vs. Salt Lake County, (Ut.), 224 Pac. (2d) 1037, where
this court said :
"Thi.s court has recognized that counties a~
quasi-municipal corporations partake of the sorereign immunity of the State, as an arm of the
state. In this respect they are similar to school
districts. See Bingham v. Board of Education of
Ogden City, (Ft.), 223 P. 2d 432." (Emphasis
ours.)
Apparently the only Utah authority cited hy appellant is the early case of Lund r. Salt Lake County, 58
Ut. 596, 200 Pac. 510. In that ca.se plaintiff sought re-
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covery against defendant for causing or permitting contaminated waters to flow into his fish ponds, destroying
his fish. Plaintiff proceeded on three theories: (1) Eminent domain; ( 2) Nuisance ; and (3) Negligence. After
rejecting the first two theories as unsound, the court
rejected the third theory on the grounds that the county
was engaged in an ultra vires act, and therefore not
liable for the torts of its agents and employees. During
the course of its discussion, it indicated, by way of
dicta, that the doctrine of respondeat superior, would
apply if the act were not ultra vires and if the county
were a municipal corporation. \Vhat was there said was
obiter dicta wholly unneces.sary to the decision. Such
reasoning has since been clearly, specifically, and unequivocally rejected by the later Utah decisions above
cited and quoted by us.
In view of the firmly established Utah law, it appears unnecessary to look to the decisions of sister states
for assistance on this point. However, appellant has
represented that the trend of authority is toward holding counties liable in tort for damages for personal
injur~r. Lest this court draw the unwarranted inference
that it stands alone on this point. we call attention to
the following recent eases fron1 other western jurisdictions as illustratiYe but bY no 1neans exhausti\e, of
'
'
.
the u1an~· authorities adhering to the s.au1e doctrine as
Utah:
In Hadrtt rs. Board of County Comm'rs of J!usko.fl<'r Couuty, Old. (Old.), 32 Pac. (~d) 9-!0, the court
::-;aid:
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"It is well settled in this state that counties
and townships .are merely quasi-municipal corporations charged by law with certain governmental and administrative functions as state
agencies, and as such are not liable in damages
for the negligence of the Bo.ard of County Commissioners or township officers, or those they are
obliged to employ in carrying on such functions."
In Board of Comm'rs of Harmon County vs. Keen,
(Okl.), 153 Pac. (2d) 483, the same court said:
"We are committed to the rule that in the
.absence of an express statute creating a liability
therefor, a county is not liable in a civil action
for damages for injuries resulting from negligent acts or omissions of its officers or those it
is obliged to employ in the performance of their
duties .as such officers or employee.s."
To the same effect see Keesee v. Board of County
Comm'rs of Kiowa County, (Kan.), 281 Pac. (2d) 1089.
Although California is represented by appellant as
adhering to the opposite rule, it does so only by express
statute known as the Public Liability Act. So much is
manifest from a reading of appellant's own authority
on the subject, Dineen v. City and County of San Francisco, (Cal. App.), 101 P. (2d) 736:
"The first question to be determined upon
this appeal is whether the respondent is generally
liable in tort for alleged injuries growing out of
the use and oper.ation of a superior courtroom,
or whether the respondent's liability is predicated
solely on the provisions of the Public Liability Act.
*** Counties are political subdivisions of the state
for purposes of government. Art. XI, Sec. 1, of
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the Constitution; Hill v. Board of Supervisors,
175 Cal. 84,167 P. 614; Reclamation District v.
Superior Court, 171 Cal. 672, 154 P. 845. Counties are vested by the state with a variety of
powers which the state it.self may assume or
resume and directly exercise. The principal purpose in establishing counties was to make effectual the political organization and civil administration of the state which require local direction,
supervision and control, including to a large extent, the administration of public justice. * * *
In so f.ar a.s the building involved is maintained
for the superior courts, the respondent is acting
as a county, in governmental capacity, performing a duty expressly imposed upon it by the state.
* * The doctrine contended for by appellant,
therefore, has no application. If the respondent
is liable at all, such liability must be based on
the provisions of the Public Liability Act."
(Emphasis ours.)
For a more recent California decision to the same
effect see:
Albraeck v. Santa Barbara County (Cal. App.),
266 Pac. ( 2d) 8-14, \\·here the court said:
'"Inasmuch as counties are agencies of the
state, their functions are exclusiYely governrnental. A.s such counties, they are protected by
the doctrine of sovereign imn1unity. Dillwood v.
Riecks, 42 Cal. App. 602, 607. lS-1 P. 35."'
Nor does Alaba1na follow the contrary rule. Although there is dicta in the case of Jones v. Jefferson
Cmtnty, (Ala.), 89 So. 17-+, (cited by appellant at page
t 5 of his brief) to that effed, on a rehearing of the same
case, reported at 89 So. 177, the court said:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
"As stated in the original op1n10n in this
case, and as all the authorities hold, counties are
neve-r liable as for torts of their officers, agents
or employees in the discharge of public or governmental functions, unless expressly made so by
constitutional or statutory provisions.
"There is a well recognized distinction between liability of counties, and that of cities or
towns, as to these matters. Towns and cities are
voluntary corporations, but counties are involuntary corporations. As was said by this court in
the case of So. Ry. Co. v. St. Clair County, 124
Ala., 495, 27 So. 25 :
"' at all periods of organized government,
territorial and state [counties] have been recognized as political divisions, created and organized
as governmental agencies or auxiliaries, to aid
by local administration, the sovereign power, in
promoting the general welfare within the territorial limits to which they are assigned . . . A
County has been defined as an involuntary political or civil division of the state, created by
statute, to aid in the administration of government. It is, in its very nature, character and
purpose public, and a governmental agency,
rather than a corporation. Whatever of power it
possesses, or whatever of duty it is required to
perform, originates in the statutes creating it,
or in the statutes declaring the power and
duty ... '
"For these reasons it is the policy of the law
not to hold the sovereign, nor its arms or agency,
such as counties, liable as for damages in the
discharge of these public duties done to preserve
the health and promote the happiness and the
general welfare of the people in the state or
county. In the discharge of these public .and governmental functions by the counties, damage or

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
injury may often result to the citizen in consequence of the negligence of some agents or officers of the state, county, or other arm or agency
of the government; but it is the law of the state
and of the land that neither the state, county,
nor other arm or agency of the government is
liable in damages to the citizens who may suffer
loss in consequence of such negligence, unless the
constitution or statutes expressly so provide."
(Emphasis our.s.)
We caution that the decisions from other jurisdictions are not necessarily helpful guides to this court.
The counties in all of the states do not have the same
constitutional origin, nor are they endowed by constitutional fiat with the same duties, obligations and immunities. In many states, the county serves a function
similar to that performed by a city in Utah. In fact,
in large metropolitan areas, city and county governments
have in many instances been merged. This has given rise
to some ambiguous situations as set forth in Dineen
v. City and County of San Francisco, supra:
"It is appellant's theory that the superior
court is a state court, and that the city hall in
which the courtroom is located is a city and county
building, and that therefore the respondent ·was
acting in a proprietary capacity in pennitting the
state court to occupy the courtroon1, and in that
capacity is liable for general negligence. The contention is unsound. The respondent is not only a
city, but a cit~~ and eounty. 'Yhile the superior
court is, in one sense, a state court, it is also a
county court. * * * A city and county government
partakes of the nature and has the powers and
exerei~K·~ the functions of both a eity and county
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* * * Although such dual organization sometimes
presents some ambiguou.s situations, it is quite
clear that in operating a superior court it is acting as a county and not as a city. * * In so far
.as the building involved is maintained for the
superior courts, the respondent is acting as a
county, in a governmental capacity, performing
a duty expre.ssly imposed upon it by the state.
* * The doctrine contended for by appellant,
therefore, has no application. If the respondent
is liable at all, such liability must be based on
the provisions of the Public Liability Act."
There may well be sound rea.sons in other jurisdictions for tre.ating counties in the same manner as cities,
and in holding them liable in tort for dam.ages resulting
from negligence in the performance of what are termed
proprietary functions. vVe submit that such reasons do
not apply in this case. By expre.ss provision of our constitution, counties exist as an arm of the state, without
the consent or acquiensence of the inhabitants. They are
created .as a subdivision of the state for the purpose
of administering the state's business. All acts which
they perform are, by definition, governmental. In this
instance, the county was authorized to establish athletic
fields, and other recreational facilities; to equip, maintain, operate and supervise the same; and to employ such
supervisors and other employees as it deemed proper
for the purpose. Sec. 11-2-1, U.C.A., 1953. The purpose
of this statute is to provide wholesome recreation for
the leisure time of the public of the county. Sec. 11-2-2,
U.C.A., 1953. This is a provision for the health and
welfare of the citizens which is a well recognized and
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traditional police function, certainly governmental in its
character.
Appellant refers to Sec.17-15-10, U.C.A., 1953, which
provides for presentation of claims against the county.
We believe that appellant intended to refer to Sec. 17-4-3,
U.C.A., 1953, providing in part as follows:
"A county has power :
"(1) To sue and be sued."
It was specifically held in Shaw vs. Salt Lake
County, (Ut.), 224 Pac. (2d) 1037, that this section was
but a general grant constituting the county an entity to
sue and be .sued, where it might under other applicable
statutes or principles, properly sue or be sued; it is not
a blanket authorization for suits to be brought against
counties. It most certainly is not sufficient authority to
support the bringing of this suit.
And in Jones v. Jefferson County, (Ala.), on rehearing, 89 So. 177, the court said:
"The mere fact that the statutes authorized
suits against counties or corporations which constitute arms or agencies of the government, does
not render them liable to actions in damages in
consequence of the torts of the agents or officers
of such corporations."
POINT II.
EVEN IF SALT LAKE COUNTY IS LIABLE IN TORT
FOR PROPRIETARY ACTS, THE OPERATION OF A PUBLI.C
GOLF COURSE IS A GOVERNMENTAL AND NOT A PROPRIETARY FUNCTION, AND THEREFORE THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN Il\IMUNITY APPLIES.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25

If the court is persuaded that we .are correct in our
Point I, there is no occasion for the court to examine
Point II. However, in the event that the court is now
disposed to tear away the cloak of sovereign immunity
which has heretofore protected counties from civil liability in tort, we contend that in this in.stance the county
was engaged in a governmental and not .a proprietary
function, and would in any event be entitled to the bene~
fits of the doctrine. It is well established in this jurisdiction that the operation of public parks and playgrounds
is a governmental as distinguished from a proprietary
function. In Alder v. Salt Lake City, (Ut.), 231 Pac.
1002, this court said:
"The most general test of governmental function relates to the nature of the activity. It must
be something done or furnished for the general
'public good, that is, of a public or governmental
character,' such as the maintenance and operation
of public schools, hospitals, public charities, public
parks or recreational facilities." (Emphasis ours.)
The court said further :
"The maintenance of the public park and the
presentation of the pageant on the 4th of July
by the defendant city were clearly matters of public service for the general .and common good, designed exclusively for the social advantage, entertainment, and pleas1tre of the general public; and
from which the city could derive no benefit in its
corporate or proprietary capacity." (Emphasis
ours.)
The doctrine was reaffirmed in the later case of
H1tsband v. Salt Lake City, 92 Ut. 449, 69 Pac. (2d) 491.
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It ha.s recently been reaffirmed in Davis v. Provo City
Corp., 1 Ut. 2d 244, 265 Pac. (2d) 415, and in Ramirez v.
Ogden City, 3 Ut. (2d) 102, 279 Pac. (2d) 463.
In the Davis case this court said:
"The great weight of judicial authority is
that the maintenance of facilities for recreation
is a public and governmental function, inasmuch
as parks and playgrounds are generally not operated by private corporations and there appears
to have developed some duty on the part of the
city to provide for parks and playgrounds. ***
There is no competition with privately owned
business, such a play area is generally operated
only by city, and the operation results in no benefit, pecuniary or otherwise, to the municipal corporation as such but is for the use of the general
public." (Emphasis ours.)
Appellant seeks to derive comfort from the fact that
a nominal charge was made by the county for the use of
the facilities provided at the golf course. Thus green
fees were charged to play the course, and a rental fee
was charged for those desiring to have the use of lockers
for storing of clothing, etc. Appellant cites in support
of this contention Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 rt. 186,
253 Pac. 4-±3, and Grifji1l v. Salt Lake City, 111 rt. 9±,
176 Pac. (2d) 156. Both of those cases involved the operation of a municipal swin1n1ing pool by Salt Lake City
wherein admissions were charged for use of the facilities.
However, there are two very in1portant differences between the facts of those two cases, and those in the case
at bar. In the first plaet•, in those cases it appears that
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able venture to the city, rendering a net profit resulting
from the surplus of income over expenses of operation.
That is exactly contrary to the situation here. Here,
revenue from the golf course, has never come close to
paying the expenses of operation. Secondly, in the swimming pool cases, it appeared that Salt Lake City was
actually in competition with private enterprise, which
was engaged in the same business for profit. There is no
evidence of that in this case. On the contrary, we believe
that this court can take judicial notice that there is no
golf course in the entire state operated by private enterprise for pecuniary profit. All of the golf courses are
either operated by governmental agencies for the benefit of their citizens, or else are purely private clubs whose
facilitie.s are available only to the limited few who belong.
In the Burton case, it was recognized that the mere
fact that a fee was charged did not make the operation
proprietary if it was otherwise governmental in character. This court said:
"True it is, as suggested by counsel for the
city, that where the municipality is clearly discharging governmental functions in conducting a
particular enterprise, or is conducting it entirely
in the interest of the public health or welfare, etc.,
the mere fact that a fee is exacted or a charge is
made is not conclusive against the city."
See also 39 Am. Jur. 835, Parks, Squares .and Playgrounds, Sec. 37, to the same effect :
"Nor does an exaction of nominal fees or a
charge used in defraying expenses impose liability
upon the city in the event of an injury."
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See also Calkins v. Newton, (Cal. App.), 97 Pac. (2d)
523, cited and relied upon by appellant:
"The imposition of a charge for service is not
inconsistent with the exercise of a governmental
function. *** Nor is the fact that the county general hospital was operated at a profit controlling.''
Appellant has cited and quoted from several cases
where the renting of a public building for private or nongovernmental u,se has been held to be proprietary activity. From these, he argues that the letting of a portion
of the club house to a private entrepreneur for the operation of a restaurant for profit, makes the operation
of the golf course, proprietary rather than governmental
in character. We believe that the fundamental distinction between those cases and the case at bar, is that in
those case.s, the use was inconsistent with or irrelevant
to the principal function of the governmental building.
rrhus in Worden v. New Bedford, 131 Mass. 23, 41 Am.
Rep. 185, (cited in appellant's brief at page 24), a room
in the city hall was let to a poultry association. Obviously
a poultry association would have no ordinary connection
with local government, and the letting of 1nunicipal office
space for private use would appear to be engaging in
private business. However, a restaurant is a normal .adjunct of a golf course, just as a lenwnade stand is a norInal adjunct of a recreation park. Nor is it a departure
from governmental actiYity to n1ake available on a lease
basis, restaurant facilities for those resorting to the
eour.se. This is similar to the case of Lcfrois Y. Countp
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tion of a farm in connection with the maintenance of an
almshouse and penitentiary was held to be a mere incident to the latter functions, and therefore governmental
in character.
A conclusive answer to this contention on the part of
appellant is found in the Ramirez case. There a snack bar
was operated for profit by a private entrepreneur in the
same building which this court held was oper.ated as a
governmental function because for the recreation and
relaxation of its citizens.
Plaintiff also relies upon two golf course cases from
foreign jurisdictions. The first is Plaza v. City of San
1llateo, (Cal.), 256 Pac. (2d) 523. In that case the California court attempted to harmonize a series of earlier
cases in some of which various types of public recreational facilities had been held to be governmental in character, while others, very similar in nature, had been held
to be proprietary in character. The court indulged in
some very dubious reasoning to arrive at the conclusion
that recreational functions which served the purposes
of public education, training for self preservation and
good citizenship, and fostering and safeguarding public
he.alth, were governmental functions, while the providing
of mere amusement or entertainment was not. The language of the court was as follows:
''But what is the primary purpose behind each
of them~ If any general conclusion is to be drawn
from a consideration of the cases, it is that public
education, tr.aining for self preservation and good
citizenship and the fostering and safeguarding
of public health are governmental functions, while
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the providing of mere amusement or entertainment is not. *** It must be conceded that time
spent by a boy in summer camp is to a degree
educational, and if nothing more, training in cooperation and good citizenship. It is a matter of
self preservation that all who are physically able
should learn to .swim for who can tell when it may
be a factor in saving not ony the life of the swimmer, but also the lives of others."
Whatever may be the rule in California, the Utah
courts have never indulged in such finely drawn reasoning. In the Alder case, the court cited "social advantage,
entertainment and pleasure of the general public" as
being governmental functions from which the city could
derive no benefit in its corporate or proprietary capacity,
and in the Ramirez case, maintenance of a building u.sed
for dancing and similar social amusements was held to be
governmental in character. It is clear therefore, that
the California decision was based upon reasoning wholly
contrary to the reasoning which has been announced by
this Court in holding parks, playgrounds and recreational facilitie.s as being governmental functions.
The case of Gorsuch v. City of Spriugfield, (Ohio
App.), 61 N.E. (2d) 898, is equally inapplicable to the
facts of this case. There, the incon1e fr01n the operation
of the golf course did not go back into the general fund,
but was maintained in a special fund and was used solely
for capital improve1nents and operation and 1naintenance
of the golf course. Over a three year period the golf
course had built up a gross balance of over $5,000 after
paying all of the PXJH'nses above 1nentioned. The evidence elParl~· showed that the operation of the golf course
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was for pecuniary profit, and that it directly benefited
the city which maintained it. The court there said:
"It is sufficient for the present case to say
that if the city in the maintenance and operation
of its municipal golf course was directly compensated or benefited by growth and prosperity of
the city and its inhabitants, .and the city had an
election to do or omit to do the acts set forth herein as shown by the evidence, the function is private and proprietary."
The facts in the Gorsuch case were wholly different
from those in the case at bar. Here the course has been
operated at a deficit for the past several years and the
nominal green fees which are charged have not been
sufficient to pay the cost of operation and maintenance.
The course is available for the use and benefit of the entire public and is operated pursuant to statutory authority set forth in Sec. 11-2-1, and Sec. 11-2-2, U.C.A.,
1953.
l\Iore similar on its facts, and therefore Inore helpful
in the determination of the case at bar, is Williams v. City
of Birmingham, (Ala.), 121 So. 14. In that case, under a
statute very similar to the statute under which defendant
Salt Lake County operates, and maintains Meadowbrook
Golf Course, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the
operation of a municipal golf course for the use and enjoyment of the inhabitants of the city, was a governmental and not a proprietary function. Said the Court:
"The park in question may be .assumed, by
judicial notice, ... to be a public enterprise, conducted by the city for the welfare of its citizens
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and the public generally, under the Act of Sept.
29, 1923....
"Under such act the power is given the city
to provide parks, playgrounds, recreational centers, or park areas by and through a park and
recreation board named by the city. There is provision made for reasonable fees or charges for
access to or use or enjoyment of any playground,
etc., conducted by the city, to be paid into and
become a part of the park and recreation fund of
the city.... The board is vested with the power to
acquire and operate for the city public parks .and
playgrounds .... "
After reviewing many cases involving the operation
of public parks and playgrounds, the court concluded as
follows:
"There being no uniform rule in this respect
established in the country at large, we must choose
our own path. *** [W]e think that, to hold the
function public and governmental, .and not merely
corporate or ministerial, is in the spirit of the
deci.sions heretofore rendered by this court, and
is our idea of the correct interpretation of such
service to the public by a city."
Although we have discovered no other cases involv~ng golf courses, the foregoing decision has been cited
with approval in many cases, of which the following are
the most similar in their facts:
Parr v. City of Birmingham. (Ala.), S5 So.
2d 888;
.Atkins v. Ci.ty of Durham, (X.C.), 186 SE
330;
Downey v. Jackson, (Ala..). 65 So. 2nd 8~5~
Commissioner of Internal Rcceuue Y. Shermau, 69 Fed. (~d) 755.
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POINT Ill.
EVEN IF THE OPERATION OF A PUBLIC GOLF COURSE
IS DEEMED TO BE A PROPRIETARY FUNCTION, THERE
IS NO EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF
DEFENDANT SALT LAKE COUNTY.
POINT IV.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE ACCIDENT WAS
·CAUSED BY ANY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF ANY
OF THE DEFENDANTS.

If the court is favorably influenced by our argument
either under Point I or Point II, it will not need to examine Points III and IV. However, if the court rules
adversely to us on both of the two preceding propositions,
we further contend that there is no evidence whatsoever
of any negligence on the part of Salt Lake County, or that
any negligence on the part of the County (or any other
defendant) caused or contributed to cause the accident.
Points III and IV involve a consideration of the same
evidence and can conveniently be discussed together.
The evidence shows without dispute, that the club
house w.as built around 1949 or 1950; that it was converted from a pre-existing building, and that among other
things, there were in the former building, concrete abutments at regular intervals along the entire east wall.
Although there was no expert testimony on the subject,
it appeared that such abutments served a useful purpose
in the structure, and they were .accordingly left there
when the building was converted for use as a golf club
house. The building was so designed and arranged that
the pro-shop or golf shop was in the northerly end, and
the coffee shop was in the central portion, and they were
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connected by a passageway running .along the east side,
in which one or two abutments were located at points
within the passageway. No artificial light had ever been
provided for the passageway from within, that is, there
was no light or lamp of any type. within the passageway
itself. However, the passageway was amply lighted by
light from the golf shop, the restaurant, and the adjacent
locker room and card room. The passageway was not a
long one, being only .about 18 feet, a distance which the
average person would traverse in about six steps. The
passageway had existed in this condition for a period of
some five to six years prior to the accident, without, so
far as the evidence shows, any previous accident, or other
untoward event. There is no evidence that any officer,
.agent, servant or employee of Salt Lake County had anything whatsoever to do with the design, construction, or
conversion of the building. Whatever danger inhered
in the concrete abutments in the passageway was not
created by the county, and was open, obvious and patent
to all who traversed it.
As we see it, the only possible ground upon which the
plaintiff can claim negligence on the part of any defendant to this action, is that the passage,vay was darkened
by the placing of the score board over the glass brick
along the easterly wall of the building. Ad1nittedly, this
had the effect of occluding a portion of the natural light
which otherwise would haYe entered the passageway
d1~rin!J daylight hours, and to that extent di1ninished the
illumination therein. The record is extre1nely hazy at
best, as to the proportion of the illun1ination provided by
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artificial light and the portion provided by natural light.
However, the record is clear, that even at night, the illumination coming from rooms at either end of the
passageway, and those adjacent thereto, was sufficient
to illuminate it sufficiently for safe passage.
The strongest testimony in the record in support of
plaintiff's po.sition is the testimony of Paul Gore, to the
effect that he stumbled over the abutment only a few
minutes before the plaintiff's accident; that it was so
dark in the hallway that he could not see it; and he didn't
know exactly what he stumbled over until he felt it after
his fall. However, Mr. Gore was a contestant in the
tournament. Quite naturally if he had been out in the
bright August sunlight immediately preceding the fall,
and if his eyes had had no opportunity to adjust to the
lighting conditions within, he would have difficulty in
seeing. This is a perfectly natural phenomenon which
everyone experiences in coming from bright outdoor light
into even a well lighted room.
On the other hand, there is an abundance of evidence
by persons who traversed the passageway during the
tournament during daylight hours, that there was ample
light to see the abutments; that they did see them,
and that they experienced no difficulty whatsoever in
observing them. Of even greater importance, is the testimony of those who traversed the passageway at night,
including plaintiff, himself. Quite obviously the amount
of outside light which would enter the passageway
through the glass bricks at night would be inconsequential, even in the absence of the scoreboard. The testimony
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is undisputed that the facilities of the club house are used
three or four nights a week, .and had been since the club
house was built. Person.s desiring to use the men's lavatory and wash room would of necessity have to proceed
through this passageway to go there. Yet there is no
evidence that any person had any difficulty traversing
the passageway, including even those who might have
their f.acultie:s somewhat impaired by indulging in alcoholic beverages. In the face of such evidence, the testimony of the witness Paul Gore, standing alone, as it does,
falls far short of satisfying plaintiff's burden of proving,
by a preponderance of the evidence that the erection of
the score board was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's accident.
The plaintiff's own testimony shows that prior to the
accident, he had been through the same passageway approximately half a dozen times. He had never on any of
his several trips observed the concrete abutments. Yet,
when he was asked directly on cross examination, why
he didn't see the large cement .abutments, he answered,
"That is what I would like to know." (R. 178). At no
place in his testimony did the plaintiff state that he failed
to see the abutment by reason of the darkness or insufficient illu1nination in the passageway. He frankly
admitted that he didn't understand why he didn't see it.
Such testimony is certainly not sufficient to sustain
plaintiff's burden of proof. As said in Schwartz, Accidents in Buildings, page 283:
"As in all negligence actions, the plaintiff
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ence of a defect in the stairs or passageways and
the injury. If the c.ause or manner of plaintiff's
fall is not clear, a verdict in his favor will not be
sustained."
Even if the court should determine that a jury might
find that it was negligence to erect the score board along
the wall, still it was erected by Riley for his own purposes, and not for any benefit of the defendant Salt Lake
County, .and in erecting the score board, he was not engaged in the course of his employment as golf pro and
manager at the Meadow Brook Golf Course. Under
Riley's contract of employment by the County (Ex. 24-P)
the duties of Riley were defined in paragraphs 7 and 8.
They were in substance, proper operation of the golf
course; promotion of instruction; supervision, operation,
improvement, and maintenance of the golf course, including supervision of tee markers; treating of tees; changing of putting cups; watering of fairways; cutting of
fairways, greens, and trees ; installation and maintenance
of ball washers ; closing green.s when necessary; requiring use of temporary greens and tees, when necessary;
establishment of .a policy requiring play by golfers in
groups of four or les.s ; and such other activity as would
be reasonably necessary to maintain, operate and improve the golf course, as the need appeared. He was
further obligated under paragr.aph 8, to maintain and
operate at reasonable prices a first clas.s golf shop, and
to have on hand an adequate supply and variety of golf
equipment and .accessories. These were the only duties
enjoined upon him by his contract of employment. lie
had no duties whatsoever in connection with the manage-
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ment, operation, or maintenance of the club house, except
the portion thereof designated as the pro shop. In consideration for the services to be rendered by him, he was
to receive various benefits as outlined in paragraphs 1, 2,
3, 4 ,and 5. Among these benefits were the right to act
and advise as consultant and architect of golf courses.; to
play in all sectional open tournaments, and to have and
promote various tournaments at the Meadow Brook Golf
Course, including one Men's open .amateur tournament
each year.
If Mr. Riley while playing in a sectional open tournament, at, for example, Ogden, had injured someone by
driving a ball into him, we do not believe that anyone
could reasonably claim that while so eng.aged he was
acting for and on behalf of Salt Lake County, or that
the county would in anywise be responsible for his acts
under those circumstances. The same reasoning would
apply here as well. Riley was engaged in the promotion
of .an open tournament in accordance with the privilege
accorded him under his contract of employn1ent. Admittedly, the score board had been prepared and erected
for the purpose of the open tournmnent. Adn1ittedly the
county derived no benefit fr01n the holding of the tournaInent. On the rontrary, the tournan1ent \Yas a detriment
to the county in that, during the holding of the tournament, public play was lilnited, and therefore the county
lost the green fees which otherwise would have been
paid. The county received no financial benefits \Yhatsoever fr01n the holding of the tournmnent. In erecting
the scoreboard, Hiley was arting solely in his O\Vn interest
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and for his own purposes, and not for any purpose, advantage or benefit of the county. If he was negligent
while so acting, such negligence is not imputable to the
county.
In summary, it appears:
(a) Th.at the:re was no negligence in the design or
construction of the club house.
(b) There is no evidence that the county, acting
through any of it,s duly authorized officers, agents, servants or employees, had any part in the design or construction of the club house.
(c) The placement of the score board along the
outside wall of the club house did not materially decrease
the illumination of the inside passageway, and there is
no evidence from which a jury could find negligence in
so doing.
(d) There is in.sufficient evidence to make a prima
facie case that the erection of the scoreboard caused, or
contributed to cause the accident to the plaintiff.
(e) In erecting the scoreboard the defendant Riley
acted solely in his own interest, and not on behalf of
S.alt Lake County, and the county is not chargeable with
his negligence, if any, in so doing.
Of course, points (c) and (d) establish a defense not
only for Salt Lake County, but for all other defendants
as well.
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POINT V.
THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

It is axiomatic that a person passing through a
darkened or insufficiently lighted passageway should
proceed with caution, commensurate with the risk involved. One may not with abandon traverse a darkened
or dimly lighted passageway with the same freedom that
one may pass through a well lighted one, in which any
obstructions to free passage would be readily apparent.
If the passageway were as dark as appellant contends
that it was, he .should have proceeded slowly .and cautiously, step by step, to be certain that the footing was safe
and sure. This is particularly true where, as here, a large
tournament was in progress, and large crowds had
gathered to observe the competition, and one might readily anticipate that a caddy bag, box of equipment, or
similar impediment might be left in the passageway by a
careless or thoughtless person.
Having traversed the passage on several previous
occasions, plaintiff knew or should have known, of all
that any formal notice might have given him. The unfortunate accident plainly resulted from plaintiff's own
negligence, and not from the conduct of any person having anything to do with the operation of the tournament.
CONCLliSION
Salt Lake County, as an .ann of the state government,
has complete soyereign ilnn1unity, and is not liable in tort
for dmnages in the operation of a public golf course. It
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is engaged in a purely governmental function, that is, of
providing wholesome recreational facilities for inhabitants of the county. The county wa.s not in anywise
negligent in the construction, operation or maintenance
of the club house. The accident did not result from any
negligence on the part of any defendant in this action,
and the plaintiff was, as appears from his own testimony,
guilty of contributory negligence.

The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
MoREToN, CHRISTENSEN

&

CHRISTENSEN

By: RAY R. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Salt Lake County
and the defendant Riley.
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